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Abstract
The Greater Tumen Initiative (GTI) is a regional cooperation 
mechanism among Republic of Korea, People’s Republic of 
China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Mongolia, 
and Russian Federation which is supported by the UNDP. GTI 
member governments established this mechanism with the goal 
of strengthening economic and technical cooperation to obtain 
greater growth and sustainable development in Northeast Asia 
particularly in the Greater Tumen Region. The GTI focuses on 
the priority areas of transport, trade and investment, tourism, 
energy, with environment as a cross-cutting sector. For South 
Korea, the GTI represents an important opportunity to actualize 
the Eurasia Initiative announced by President Park Geun-hye in 
October 2013. The Eurasia Initiative is a proposal to link rail and 
road networks, energy, and logistics infrastructure from Korea’s 
Busan across the Eurasian continent to Europe in a modern ‘Silk 
Road Express.’ One potential energy mineral resource partner 
for the ROK could be Mongolia. The GTI transportation grid 
design meshes completely with Mongolia’s intention to re-
orient its mineral resource customers from China to consumers 
in Korea, Japan, and Europe. Establishing a new cross-border 
transportation network should strengthen ROK-Mongolian 
energy cooperation.
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Introduction 
The Greater Tumen Initiative (GTI), originally called the Tumen River 
Area Development Programme (TRADP), is a regional cooperation 
mechanism among Republic of Korea, People’s Republic of China, 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Mongolia, and Russian 
Federation which is supported by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP). In 1995, GTI member governments signed 
agreements to establish this mechanism with the goal of 
strengthening economic and technical cooperation to obtain 
greater growth and sustainable development in Northeast Asia 
(NEA), particularly in the Greater Tumen Region. The GTI focuses 
on the priority areas of transport, trade and investment, tourism, 
energy, with environment as a cross-cutting sector. The GTI vision is 
for a partnership for prosperity among neighbors, with the goal to 
become an effective platform for regional economic cooperation, 
expanding policy dialogue, improving business environments, and 
contributing to NEA peace and stability. 
The core decision-making institution is the GTI’s Consultative 
Commission, composed of vice-ministers from GTI member 
governments. The Commission’s role is to foster support for 
regional cooperation and development, and promote mutual 
understanding. It convenes annually to discuss key policy issues 
and cooperation projects, and hosts joint sessions with strategic 
partners and local governments.
In addition, the GTI works closely with international partners 
to jointly promote the region and hosts both the NEA EXIM 
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Banks Association and the Local Cooperation Committee. It has 
established strong partnerships with regional governments, 
international organizations, and the private sector to jointly 
initiate cooperative activities. With both a skilled and low-cost 
labor pool, the Tumen River basin site is at the crossroads of 
vital trade, transport and energy routes. Rich in gas, oil and 
minerals, the region has easy access to affluent markets and 
hundreds of millions of NEA consumers. Increased regional 
cooperation is projected to not only lead to economic prosperity 
and sustainable development, but also to contribute significantly 
to regional solidarity and stability.1  
For South Korea, the GTI represents an important opportunity 
to actualize the Eurasia Initiative announced by President Park 
Geun-hye in October 2013.2 The Eurasian Initiative is a proposal 
to link rail and road networks, energy, and logistics infrastructure 
from Korea’s Busan across the Eurasian continent to Europe in 
a modern “Silk Road Express.” One potential energy mineral 
resource partner for the ROK could be Mongolia. Mongolia, 
for its part, is a rapidly developing resource economy rich in 
coal, natural gas, petroleum, copper, gold, and uranium, but 
overwhelmingly dependent on China as its customer because of 
poor northeast outbound transportation routes. It is determined 
to find new mineral customers in Northeast Asia to break the 
Chinese monopoly over its economy and diversify trade partners. 
The GTI transportation grid design meshes completely with 
Mongolia’s intention to re-orient its valuable mineral resource 
customers from China to consumers in Korea, Japan, and Europe. 
Active ROK partnering initiatives for railway development 
with Mongolia and Russia to improve regional transport 
infrastructure and ease trans-border transportation passages 
would have an immediate impact on the existing Jilin, China 
international cooperative demonstration zone, which includes 
the participation of 48 South Korean companies and 48 Chinese 
regional governmental agencies and businesses.3 Furthermore, 
this new railway development project coupled with Chinese 
railway construction traveling towards North Korea will connect 
the Tumen and Yalu Rivers as well as link North Korea’s major 
cities with China and other regional countries. These efforts, then, 
have the potential to boost the construction of NEA international 
transit corridors and promote the cross-border economic and 
energy cooperation sought in the Eurasia Initiative. 
Any new rail development undertaken by South Korean companies 
also holds specific benefits for each of the GTI countries and 
should spur competition over Mongolian and Siberia-Russian 
minerals. While these rich coal, copper, gold, petroleum, natural 
gas, rare earth, and uranium resources could be moved to willing 
Korean customers, it is just as probable that they will find new 
economic partners in Asia and across the Pacific. Thus, GTI 
members are likely to overcome any present political impasses 
to realize the goal of greater transportation integration.
Greater Tumen River Basin 
GTI Ulaanbaatar meeting of October 30-
November 2, 2013
The 14th meeting of the Consultative Committee of the GTI 
and Northeast Asia Economic Cooperation Forum was held 
in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia from October 30 to November 2, 
2013. Vice Ministers of GTI member nations discussed regional 
cooperation and development strategy in the NEA region, 
reaffirmed the significance of GTI in building regional partnership 
for common prosperity, and reviewed transforming its strategic 
direction into an independent organization by 2016.4 The focus 
of the discussions evolved from GTI’s Integrated Transport 
Infrastructure & Cross-border Facilitation Study for the Trans-
GTR Transport Corridors released in February 2013.5 As the NEA 
region has enormous potential for development, especially in 
port arrangement and infrastructure construction, one of the 
prime challenges discussed at this year’s Consultative Committee 
session was how financing institutions can meet demand from 
the private sector, and what kind of channels and mechanisms 
can be provided in bringing about regional economic prosperity? 
The Northeast Asia Economic Forum, which facilitates dialogue 
on NEA economic and development cooperation, took place 
immediately following the Consultative Commission meeting. 
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This session focused on the legal status of the GTI program and 
assessed project implementation on consolidating structures 
of trans-border transportation passages and simplification of 
border entrances. The Forum brought together more than 100 
delegates from GTI member governments, the business sector, 
and financing associations.6     
This round of consultation established the Northeast Asia 
EXIM (Export-Import) Banks Association, which consists of the 
EXIM banks of the ROK and China, the Developmental Bank 
of Mongolia (DBM) and Russia’s State Corporation Bank for 
Development and Foreign Economic Affairs (Vnesheconombank). 
The Bank Association’s main function is to collaborate with the 
GTI and member governments in financing suitable economic 
projects in the region. The Association of Development Financing 
Institutions in Asia and the Pacific (ADFIAP) came to the Forum 
to share its knowledge and insight “into the strategic prospects 
of economic integration in Northeast Asia, with long-term 
goals of strengthening trade and investment ties, promoting 
partnerships and synergizing efforts on Northeast Asia regional 
development.”7 All parties reached legal agreement to further 
develop the GTI into an international organization and to 
increase financial support for it. Korean proposals for organizing 
an agricultural sector board, regularly holding a GTI International 
Trade and Investment Expo, and setting up a strong network 
among policy research institutions were accepted.8  The next GTI 
Consultative Commission meeting will be held in China in 2014. 
Mongolia’s View of Domestic and Trans-regional  
Rail Development
Because Mongolia annually exports about 100 million tons of 
mostly raw minerals, it seeks to construct a new railroad north 
to diversify its customers and relieve congestion on the southern 
rail route to China. Mongolia only has one north-south railroad—
Ulaanbaatar Railways—and no east-west rail crossing the country. 
Freight turnover on Ulaanbaatar Railways is growing annually: in 
2012 freight turnover was about 20.4 million tons and in 2013 it 
increased another 2.7 million tons. As a result, Mongolia wants 
to build four new accesses to China and another two accesses to 
Russia—an enormous investment estimated at around $1 billion. 
In 2010 the Mongolian Parliament approved the governmental 
policy to develop railway transportation capacity, especially 
as related to mining and transit freight transportation. Over 
$400 million will be needed to undertake the first stage of the 
Ulaanbaatar Railway’s expansion. Innovation and financing has 
been sought from China and Russia. In October 2013 Mongolia 
agreed to establish a working group with China to oversee 
the construction of new road, rail and pipeline infrastructure 
connecting the two countries with Russia. A Mongolian official 
explained that landlocked Mongolia aimed to become a “transit 
corridor” to facilitate trade between its two giant neighbors and 
reduce the costs of delivering Russian commodities like oil and 
natural gas BSE 1.16  percent to Chinese markets.9 
This topic was discussed with PRC Prime Minister Li Keqiang in 
Mongolian Prime Minister Norov Altanhayag’s mid-October visit 
to Beijing, which resulted in plans to organize a working group 
to allow Chinese firms to invest and build additional transit 
infrastructure. A domestic rail link to the Russian Far East is now 
under construction and half of a direct rail line into China has been 
completed, with the project scheduled to be finished by 2015. 
The Mongolian Development Bank disbursed an initial funding 
of $55 million for the design and survey of the 1800 km ‘New 
Railway’ project, and an additional $200 million for construction 
work for 243 km of TT-GS rail for the Tavan Tolgoi coal/uranium 
mine, 540 km south of the Mongolian capital Ulaanbaatar, to the 
Chinese border.10  
Mongolia complains that it has not received fair value for its 
coal because of the lack of alternative buyers to the Chinese. It 
hopes the improved transport infrastructure envisioned in the 
GTI will allow it to generate more revenue from its coal sector by 
diversifying its mineral energy customers. Since Mongolia was a 
Soviet satellite and its railway now is Russian-gauge, Mongolian 
policymakers have chosen to expand this gauge domestically, 
which would favor mineral products flowing north into Russia 
and out to Pacific Rim customers. The importance of the China 
market for Mongolia cannot be underestimated with more than 
90 percent of its exports delivered to China. Soaring Chinese 
demand for commodities like coal has resulted in a Mongolian 
double digit growth rate since 2010. However, Chinese economic 
hegemony has fueled strong discontent among the Mongolian 
people and lawmakers, who forced a change in the foreign 
investment law in 2012 to limit foreign ownership in “strategic” 
sectors such as mining. The country began awarding bids for route 
spur expansion to link large mineral deposits to the main trans-
Siberian rail system rather than approve Chinese-gauge rail spurs 
directly to China. Mongolian construction contractors do not yet 
have the technical ability to fully handle this new construction on 
their own, so they must partner with foreign expertise. 
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Increasingly, South Korea is their partner of choice. This is 
supported by the fact that the ROK is Mongolia’s 4th largest trade 
partner. From 1995 to 2005 the export of minerals, particularly 
gold, dominated Mongolian exports to South Korea, while the ROK 
sold transportation and machinery/electrical products, as well as 
textiles and foodstuffs to the Mongols.11 More recently, South 
Korean-Mongolian trade has been dominated by investment in 
the construction industry. Bilateral trade volume amounted to 
$230 million in 2010, an 85-fold increase from $2.71 million in 
1990.12 As evidence of Mongolia’s desire to have the ROK as its 
preferred rail construction partner, on May 8, 2013 Samsung C&T 
was commissioned by the Railway Authority of Mongolia as the 
sole contractor to implement the $483-million project to build 
217 km of TT-GS rail as well as constructing a rolling stock depot.13 
Mongolia has been actively expanding its inter-regional contacts 
with other Asian countries to develop the mechanisms for 
economic partnership. An example is its accession to the Asia-
Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) this past October. The APTA 
is a preferential trade agreement (PTA) whose membership 
is open to all developing member states of United Nations 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) 
currently spanning East, South-East, and South Asia. Mongolia 
joins Bangladesh, China, India, Lao PDR, ROK, and Sri Lanka. Dr. 
Ravi Ratnayake, Director ESCAP Trade and Investment Division, 
analyzed Mongolia’s accession: “Business opportunities arising 
from preferential trade and investment cooperation under 
APTA could generate higher incomes from exports and create 
employment in export-led industries for Mongolian people.”14 
Another example of Mongolia’s new inter-regional approach 
was the December 18, 2013 consultative meeting in Ulaanbaatar 
of The Mongolian-Russian-Chinese Northern Railway. The 
Mongolian Minister of Road and Transportation Amarjargal 
Gansukh explained that Mongolia sought cooperation with its 
neighbors in freight transportation between Asia and Europe 
and would pay more attention to upgrading transportation 
facilities that would meet all necessary transit requirements for 
enhancing the trans-northern railway corridor running through 
Mongolia from Russia’s Ulaan Ude to Jinin province in China.15 
South Korean Plans for Northeast Asian Rail Expansion
In the last ten years, ROK exports and overall trade have 
expanded. Exports valued at $556.5 billion in 2012 represented 
an increase of 19.3 percent over 2011, and imports in the same 
period increased by 23.3 percent. The land transportation 
network for South Korea within the context of the NEA is based 
on two vertical and two horizontal axes. The two vertical axes 
are Busan (Korea)–Khabarovsk (Russia) and Dalian (China)–
Khabarovsk (Russia). The two horizontal axes are Busan (Korea)-
Dalian (China) and the Tumen River area–Chita (Russia). The 
transportation infrastructure throughout this region has many 
impediments due to different railway gauges, old transition 
systems, bottlenecks at border points, biased air route allotment 
for national-flag airlines, and complicated customs clearance 
system.16 Nevertheless, if the Korean economy is to continue 
its expansion and feed its energy needs, these transportation 
construction challenges must be systematically overcome. 
On November 13, 2013 President Park Guen-hye held a summit 
with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Seoul and signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that called for steel giant 
POSCO, Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., and Korea Railroad Corp. 
to participate in the Rajin-Khasan development project. The 
project is designed to turn North Korea’s ice-free northeastern 
port of Rajin into a logistics hub for sending cargo by rail to and 
from East Asia and Europe via the Russian Trans-Siberian Railway. 
After five years and $340 million of renovation, a 54-kilometer, 
double-track rail link reopened in September 2013 between 
Rajin—North Korea’s first special economic zone (SEZ) in 1991—
and the nearby Russian town of Khasan.17 South Korean firms 
now can ship exports first to Rajin and transport them elsewhere 
via Russian railways. 
RasonKonTrans, the Russian-North Korean joint venture, will 
implement the rail and port renovation project. Russian Railways, 
a state monopoly, has a 70 percent stake in this entity, with the 
DPRK holding the remaining 30 percent. News reports have said 
that, after a due diligence study to be conducted in 2014, the 
South Korean consortium will buy about half the Russian stake 
in the rail joint venture. This purchase, which is an indirect 
investment via Russia, seemingly is in conflict with Seoul’s ban 
“If the Korean economy is to 
continue its expansion and feed 
its energy needs, transportation 
construction challenges must  
be systematically overcome in 
the region.”
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on new investments in North Korea, but, if it goes forward, 
could pave the way for similar indirect investments in the North. 
The partnering of the ROK with Russia on other long-term 
transportation construction projects, including building a natural 
gas pipeline linking Russia and South Korea via the North and 
creating Arctic shipping routes to reduce shipping distances and 
time between Asia and Europe, are indications that South Korea 
is responding to the challenge of developing new transportation 
links to mineral and energy resources. The Korean press has 
reported that the two countries’ sovereign wealth funds agreed 
to set up a $500 million joint fund aimed at increasing cross-
border investments in various companies and projects.18 But 
according to Kim Sang-won, a Russian economy specialist and 
professor at Kookmin University, South Korean firms would need 
reassurances from Moscow about the political and economic 
stability of the region before making any commitments, and they 
struggle with the problem of local bureaucracy and corruption.19 
The Rajin-Khasan development project fits neatly into President 
Park’s Eurasian Initiative. During the summit with Putin, she 
stated that her rail transportation strategy includes Eurasian 
energy linkage cooperation: “Logistics and energy network 
in the Eurasian region will not only reduce logistics costs and 
stimulate global trade, but will also stabilize raw materials costs 
and contribute to the growth of the world economy…If trade 
barriers are gradually taken down and Eurasia becomes a free 
trade zone, Eurasia could be made into a gigantic market like the 
European Union.”20   
Such a rail project has been talked about for many years. Called 
an ‘Iron Silk Road,’ prospects for fruition often were stymied due 
to strategic concerns.21 The Korean Railroad Research Institute 
(KRRI),22 the ROK’s think tank in the railway sector, has been 
researching how to connect trans-Korean and intercontinental 
rail networks to realize a borderless economic bloc. It concluded 
that construction of a logistics and transportation system is an 
important issue in the economic relations between the two 
Koreas. It recommended that, first, logistic bottlenecks needed 
to be resolved to secure a stable and cost effective transportation 
route. In the long run, the completion of the trans-Korean Rail 
would “lead to the development of a strategic international 
multimodal transport route connecting to Northeast Asia and 
Europe.”23 Such railway development has been a major part of 
plans for development of North Korean SEZs, which have been 
devised around creating a new rail axis between the North and 
South and then on to Russia, China, and Mongolia. This concept 
correlates closely with the transportation ideas embodied in 
the GTI program.
The Role of Russia’s Rail Network
The Russian government has long felt that its Russian Railways 
(RZD) contributes to the development of the transit potential of 
Russia. Its key transit route runs east to west. According to the 
RZD 2012 Annual Report, RZD potential is determined by many 
factors, but above all by the rapid development of the Chinese 
economy. China’s export infrastructure is overloaded. The ports 
of Shanghai and Guangdong are currently working at 20-25 
percent above their planned capacity level while the workload 
of the railway infrastructure in China is 7-8 times higher than the 
average European level. In response RZD is involved in a project 
to create the transit east-west corridor through its subsidiary 
company Russian Railways Logistics. The main RZD objectives 
for the period 2013–2015 are to increase Russian Railways’ 
share in the international transport market (primarily Eurasian); 
strengthen the competitive position of RZD in relation to 
alternative means of transport and foreign carriers; and attract 
transit freight traffic to the Russian railway network. RZD seeks 
strategic cooperation with partners in the Asia-Pacific region 
in the fields of railway transport, logistics and implementation 
of joint investment projects and to develop container traffic as 
a backbone of transit flows in the key international transport 
corridors, particularly in the transcontinental east-west direction, 
using the Trans-Siberian trunk railway.24  
President Putin as early as 2000 aimed to develop the eastern 
Siberian regions farthest away from Moscow. His goal is to 
upgrade and extend the Trans-Siberian railway network to the 
Korean Peninsula and lay new oil-and-gas pipelines across Siberia 
in order for Russia to become the key carrier for cargo and 
energy between East Asia and Europe. For the Russian Railway 
network, the main driver of loading growth has been exports. In 
the Far East, network loading in 2012 beat the highest figure ever 
recorded in the entire history of Russian railways by 30 percent.25 
The highest gain in freight turnover has been seen in eastern 
railways, from Krasnoyarsk to the Far East, which has increased 
5.7 percent versus 2011 and 32 percent versus 2007. Freight 
traffic destinations continue to focus on Russian ports. Since the 
incorporation of RZD in 2003, transportation to the ports of the 
Azov and Black Sea basin has increased by 41 percent and to 
Northwest and Far East ports 2.1 times.26 Because the load factor 
of a number of sections has reached its peak, RZD has determined 
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that continued regular train service will require large-scale 
infrastructure investments, which Russia itself cannot afford. 
The highest loading increase in 2012 was seen in construction 
cargo, coal, oil, and oil products.27 In that year the increase in 
coal loading was 3.9 percent or 11.4 million tons. Transportation 
volume in the domestic market decreased by 1.9 percent, but 
export loading increased by 13.3 percent, destined mainly for 
Japan, Great Britain, Turkey, Korea and China. Coal export growth 
rates significantly exceeded production performance. In 2012 
the share of exports of the total volume of coal produced in 
Russia reached 36 percent. The increase in oil cargo loading was 
8.2 million tons (+3.3 percent in 2011) for new capacity. Major 
risks to RZD as an oil cargo carrier are related to a significant 
deceleration of oil production in Russia and the fast growth 
of competing means of transport, such as main oil pipelines. 
In December 2012 two years ahead of the schedule, the 
second phase of the Eastern Siberia–Pacific (ESP) oil pipeline 
construction was completed, so oil supplies by rail transport 
are expected to decrease by some 10-12 million tons a year. 
However, positive trends that contributed to an increase in 
the railway transportation of oil cargo in 2012 are expected to 
provide growth in the medium term.28  
Loading to ports of the Far East remains historically high; it 
continues increasing despite expected stabilization. Nonetheless, 
the number of defective track infrastructure fixed assets is growing 
with many facilities still in operation after their serviceable 
life has expired.29 About 31 percent of all currently operated 
engineering structures were built before 1913. If current trends 
continue, by the year 2015 the RZD predicts the serviceable life 
of 38 percent of the structures will have expired (for supports 
the serviceable life is 80-100 years, for pipe culverts 100 years, 
and for metal spans 60 years). Insufficient carrying capacity of 
railway hauls is often a reason for the limited capacity of the 
whole track. In 2012 three sections of the Far Eastern Railway and 
two sections of the East Siberian Railway in the Russian Far East 
had limited capacity hauls.30 Russell Pittman’s forthcoming study 
of the RZD’s restructuring program’s strategy for development 
until 2030 clearly indicates that “significant expansion of the 
coverage and capacity of the overall rail infrastructure” is key to 
the RZD’s future.31
An additional financial burden on the RZD has been its agreement 
to increase its share capital of the joint venture Ulaanbaatar 
Railway. Both the Russian and Mongolian partners have increased 
the authorized capital by $250 million to construct new rail 
infrastructure. Also the RZD has funded the new rail line between 
Khasan, Russia and Rajin, North Korea. This spur, crossing through 
the GTI basin, will enable the Russians and Mongols to use the 
North Korean port as an alternative to overcrowded Vladivostok. 
Russia is looking for new foreign partners to finance the RZD’s 
modernization and expansion. Putin’s summit with President 
Park revolved around seeking South Korea’s participation in 
various rail projects, including the Rajin port’s modernization. 
South Korea has shown interest in linking its largest port Busan to 
the DPRK. Any such investment has been barred since the sinking 
of a South Korean naval warship in 2010 attributed to a North 
Korean attack. However, with the November ROK-Russia summit 
agreement and overall progress in this year’s GTI discussions, it is 
anticipated that South Korean cooperation with Russia on new rail 
infrastructure will accelerate.
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Conclusion
When looking at energy demands and growth in Northeast 
Asia, researchers such as Kent Calder of Johns Hopkins have 
noted that “Northeast Asian countries also face serious and 
unique developmental challenges that would make a deeper 
and richer local network of regional organizations mutually 
advantageous.” He has discussed the “organizational gap” and 
the rise of pressure for more regional integration32 and coined 
the concept of the “new continentalism.”33 He argues that a 
new transnational configuration is emerging in Asia driven by 
economic growth, rising energy demand, and the erosion of 
longstanding geopolitical divisions. His ‘New Silk Road’ is not far 
from ROK President Park’s Eurasia Initiative and Silk Road Express.
The GTI framework, long dormant, is now being used by 
partner countries to springboard new regional cooperation in 
transportation construction and logistical projects. Research 
by the Greater Tumen Initiative forecasts that for the DPRK the 
projects will activate the local economy of Rason by restoring 
some parts of the old railways and increase cooperation between 
DPRK and Russia, as well as improving economic ties with 
northeast China and Mongolia. As for Russia, such projects will 
resolve the congestion at Far Eastern ports and will modernize 
and strengthen the Eurasian logistics network of the RZD. 
Russia’s economic and political influence in the DPRK and the 
NEA as a railway and energy power should further increase. The 
ROK can look forward to easing of political tension on the Korean 
Peninsula with development around Rajin based on a trilateral 
cooperation among ROK, DPRK, and Russia. The projects also 
will link South Korea more closely to Mongolian and Siberian 
mineral/energy resources and stimulate greater economic 
growth. Regarding China, GTI cooperative actions will promote 
economic development of the three Northeastern provinces and 
permit acquisition of energy-related commodities from Russia 
and the DPRK. For Mongolia, the limitations of a land-locked 
country will be overcome and economic development will be 
accelerated as northern and eastern exits are secured. Even 
for Japan, especially its western region of Niigata, Tottori, and 
Kanazawa, GTI integration can be another commercial entry into 
northeast China, Russia, Mongolia, and Europe.34 
Any Northeast Asian railway cooperation model must create 
an international transport network through a cooperation 
consultative group mechanism. The GTI plan through the UNDP 
uses the existing international railway cooperation bodies and 
organizations, does not require establishment of additional 
international organizations, and thus minimizes the financial 
burden of manpower and equipment.35  As the 2013 Integrated 
Report Infrastructure & Cross-border Facilitation Study for the 
Trans-GTR Transport Corridors emphasizes, the GTI “must be an 
organization that comprehensively deliberates on the bilateral 
and multilateral issues of international railway operation from 
the perspective of joint benefits in the Northeast Asia regions. 
Therefore, organization of a Northeast Asia railway cooperation 
consultative group requires step-by-step strategies because 
stakes of the related countries are different and the standards 
of railway infrastructures and services in the countries vary 
significantly.”36 Its short-term task is to develop multilateral 
projects and resolve issues in a timely manner, which might best 
be accomplished in a pilot project. This would build trust among 
the partner countries and come to practical solutions to interface 
among the connected routes and customs operations to resolve 
bottlenecks in each country. Positive results should generate 
international publicity that will encourage financial partners 
to participate in the very costly, but necessary, Northeast Asia 
railway network expansion.
Ultimately, the GTI’s long-range goal is to facilitate a 
“Northeast Asia peace project” through the Northeast Asia 
railway cooperation consultative group that would develop 
into an independent organization of Northeast Asian railway 
cooperation. The key functions of this organization would be 
to promote railway operational improvement, set freight and 
passenger railway rates, and improve railway routes and signal 
systems. Such efforts are aimed maximizing the integrative 
role of transport passages of all varieties in a vibrant economic 
market.37 If this goal is one day realized, the benefits to the GTI 
partner nations—China, Russia, Mongolia, DPRK, and ROK—
will be substantial. Furthermore, an enhanced South Korean-
Mongolian energy mineral trade connection along a new rail 
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